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AUSTRALIA'S FROZEN 'ORPHAN' EMBRYOS:
A MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL
DILEMMA
by George P. Smith, 1I*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE
BACKGROUND AND THE ISSUE
The major news story of June 18, 1984, in Australia and around
the world, was the discovery that two frozen embryos might well
become, if successfully implanted in a surrogate mother, heirs to an
estate left by the death of a husband and wife thought to be their
biological parents.' The facts revealed that in 1981 Mario and Elsa
Rios, from Los Angeles, California, participated in the in vitro fer-
tilization program of Melbourne's Queen Victoria Medical Center.2
* B.S., J.D., Indiana University; LL.M., Columbia University; Professor of
Law, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. The author was the
Fulbright Visiting Professor of Law and Medical Jurisprudence at the University
of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, at the time the story of the "orphan"
embryos was being written initially. He lectured throughout Australia on a number
of topics including in vitro fertilization.
Hancock & Ford, Frozen Embryo Orphans Heir to $8m Estate, The Aus-
tralian, June 18, 1984, at 7, col. 7.
In 1983, Canberra, Australia, became the first place in the world where a
human pregnancy resulted from a fertilized egg that had been frozen, thawed and
implanted in the mother's womb. Frozen Embryos Trigger Debate by Australians,
Wash. Post, May 17, 1983, at 1, col. 6. The cost of developing and maintaining
an in vitro or test-tube baby program for seven years in order to produce Australia's
first progeny was over one million dollars. Williamson, Test Tube Births: An Un-
certain Way Ahead, The Nat'l Times, Feb. 7-13, 1982, at 12, col. 5.
2 Essentially, the in vitro fertilization (IVF) process involves obtaining immature
ova (or oocytes) from a woman's reproductive tract, placing them in a culture
medium and then fertilizing them with sperm that itself has either been obtained
normally from a donor bank or from the candidate's husband. Within several days
after the conceptus has reached the blastocyst stage of development, it is transplanted
(or transferred as a human embryo) into the genetic mother who produced the egg
or, if she is unable to carry the conceptus, to a surrogate mother. See Leeton,
Trounson & Wood, IVF and ET: What It Is and How It Works, in TEST-TUBE
BAams 2-10 (W. Walters, P. Singer eds. 1982). See also Note, The 'Brave New Baby'
and the Law: Fashioning Remedies for the Victims of In Vitro Fertilization,
4 AM. J. L. & MED. 319 (1978); Hearings on H.R. 142 Before the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology, 98th
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Then fifty years old and infertile, Mr. Rios allowed a local, anon-
ymous donor from Melbourne to artificially inseminate three eggs
from his thirty-seven year old wife; one was implanted and the other
two were frozen for possible use in the future. Mrs. Rios subsequently
miscarried and was not emotionally stable enough at that time to
undertake further implantations. Before she could return and en-
deavor to use the other embryos, she and her husband died in a
Chilean plane crash. Because no will was executed by the Rios', the
California laws of intestate succession3 apply. Thus, Mr. Rios' son
by a previous marriage is entitled to his father's share of the estate
and Mrs. Rios' sixty-five year old mother takes her daughter's share.'
The central issues raised here are whether the two frozen embryos
have a legal right to 1) live and be implanted in a surrogate mother,
and, when and if they are born, 2) assert inheritance rights in the
Rios' estate. Equally important is the question of the extent to which
research into the new reproductive technologies should be allowed
or restricted.5
II. THE COMMON LAW
Early in its development, the common law concept of quickening,
especially as it was articulated in the criminal laws, was inextricably
related to theology. 6 While early Christian teaching stressed the sanct-
ity of life from its beginning at fertilization, this particular view was
modified subsequently and a distinction was made between an embryo
formatus and an embryo informatus.7 Thus, life was regarded as
commencing at the unborn infant's first movement in the womb,
or when it quickened and was thus infused with a soul.' Consequently,
the early common law scholars maintained that only after the foetus
quickened could its destruction be classified as murder. 9
Cong., 2nd Sess. 35-4 1(1984)(testimony of Howard W. Jones, M.D.)[hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
' See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6401, 6402 (West 1985).
4 Wallis, Quickening Debate Over Life on Ice, TIME, July 2, 1984, at 68.
Lawson, Molloy, Jobson & Walley, The Frozen Embryo Mystery: The Life
and Strange Times of Elsa Rios, THE BULLETIN, July 3, 1984, at 22 (Austl.).
6 Gavigan, The Criminal Sanction as It Relates to Human Reproduction: The
Genesis of The Statutory Prohibition of Abortion, 5 J. LEGAL HIST. 20 (1984).
See generally Smith, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apeotheosis?,
63 NEB. L. REV. 709 (1984).





A. The Australian Posture
The multi-disciplinary Medical Research Ethics Committee of
the National Health and Medical Research Council has reviewed
divergent community views concerning both the moral and ethical
status of foetuses and concluded that while the traditional legal
position may be more definite in some regards, 0 it is quite vague
in other respects." Nevertheless, it was concluded that prior to birth
and separation from its mother, a foetus (or an embryo) has but
potential or contingent civil legal rights, depending upon the particular
stage of gestation, as well as limited protection under the criminal
laws of abortion and child destruction. 2 Indeed, in an interesting
judicial corollary, Sir Harry Gibbs, Chief Justice of The Australian
High Court, ruled in March, 1983, "that a foetus has no right of
its own until it is born and has a separate existence from its mother.'
' 3
B. Imperfect Civil Rights and Inadequate Criminal Sanctions
None of these imperfect, potential or contingent civil rights or
inadequate criminal sanctions on abortion or child destruction have
any application to a frozen embryo before implantation, for the law
has refused to recognize the moment of fertilization as the point at
10 ETHICS IN MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING THE HUMAN FETUS AND HUMAN
FETAL TISSUE, 2.9-2.10 (Canberra, 1983).
" The essential controversy or ambiguity stems from a failure to define with
precision who is a person, thus entitled to legal protection, and when an entity is
recognized as dead. For example, is a separated viable foetus to be recognized
legally as a "person"? Or, is a separated previable foetus to be considered a "person"
if that foetus shows momentary signs of life after delivery even though it has no
chance whatsoever of living independently due to its prematurity? Because of these
uncertainties, the larger question is when does one become civilly or criminally liable
for interfering with the life of such an entity. In the three Australian states of
Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania, legislation provides that a child is
born "when it has completely proceeded . . . from the body of its mother." Bates,
Legal Criteria for Distinguishing Between Live and Dead Human Foetuses and
Newborn Children, 6 U.N.S.W.L. REV. 143, 145 (1983). Thus, for testing application
of the laws of homicide, murder and manslaughter, one cannot be charged with
a crime for destruction of an entity unless it is completely extruded from the body.
Id.; Bates, Foetal and Neonatal Life, Death and The Law, 9 LEGAL SERVICES BULL.,
Feb.-Mar. 1984 at 41-43.
2 McKay v. Essex Health Auth., 2 W. AUSTL. R. 890 (1982); See Reagan,
Abortion and The Conscience of The Nation, 9 HUM. LIFE REV. 7 (1983).
'1 State v. T., 57 AUSTL. L.J. REP. 285 (1983). This is essentially the same
posture of the courts of the United States as a consequence of Roe v. Wade, 432
U.S. 464 (1977). But see M. TOOLEY. ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE (1983).
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which legal rights are conferred. 4 In two states of Australia, New
South Wales and The Australian Capital (A.C.T.), there is authority
to suggest that no legal protection is afforded the foetus until it has
developed for a period of twenty-eight weeks. 5 Judicial opinions in
other states have suggested that the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy
is the pivotal point at which full legal protection will be given a
foetus. 16
The Deputy Chairman of the New South Wales Law Reform
Commission, a widely respected figure in the developing field of the
new reproductive biology, has stated that any claims of the Melbourne
"orphan" embryos against the Rios' estate are "fanciful.' ' 7 The
Attorney General of the State of Victoria, agreeing with that position,
stated that the embryos have no legal status of any nature. Fur-
thermore, if they were successfully implanted and subsequently born,
they would be the legal offspring of the surrogate "mother" and
her husband."8 Interestingly, in 1979, the Ethics Advisory Board of
the former United States Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (now Health and Human Services) concluded that the human
embryo was entitled to "profound respect." This entitlement, though,
did not extend necessarily to a full recognition of the legal and moral
rights belonging to human persons. 9
Presently, absent a direction by the decedents before death, the
Lucas, Abortion in New South Wales-Legal or Illegal, 52 AUSTRL. L.J. 327-
39 (1978). For a comparative analysis of the American and British posture, see
Annas & Eilas, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer.: Medico-Legal Aspects
of a New Technique to Create a Family, 17 FAM. L. Q. 199 (1983); Edwards &
Steptoe, Current Status of IVF and Implantation of Human Embryos, THE LANCET,
Dec. 3, 1983, at 1265.
"1 Bates, supra note 11 at 42-43.
16 Id.
', Hancock & Ford, supra note 1.
I d.; see Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers
and Surrogate Mothers, 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 639 (1983); Smith, Through a
Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 MJCH. L. REv. 127
(1968).
,1 See DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD,
Report and Conclusions: HEW Support of Research Involving Human In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer (1979). While clinical work and studies of in
vitro fertilization processes continue apace in the United States, there has been no
federally supported research in this field since 1975 and prospects appear quite dim
for such to be granted. Abramowitz, A Stalemate on Test Tube Baby Research,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1984, at 5.
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Rios embryos are the legal responsibility of the hospital where they
are kept. 0
III. THEORIES OF RECOVERY
There are four possible legal theories under which considerations
could be given, hypothetically, to the Rios' embryos. First, they could
be viewed as personal property and pass by the intestate laws of
succession to the heirs of the Rios' family, thereby allowing the heirs
to do with the embryos as they wish. The difficulty here is that for
embryos to be considered personal property, they must be recognized
in the law as having an economic value.2" Such a determination is,
at this stage, impossible to make.
2
Secondly, the embryos could be treated as though they were
fully developed children and subject to the appointment of a guardian
ad litum by a court in order to determine what would be in the
"best interests" of the embryos vis-a-vis their implantation or de-
struction. Thirdly, since it is unlikely that the existing law would
elevate the frozen embryos to a legal status of some type of "per-
sonhood," one could accept Mr. Chief Justice Gibb's previously
stated position and regard the embryos as non-entities.
Finally, the Queen Victoria Hospital could be recognized as the
constructive trustee for the deceased Rioses and, accordingly, be al-
lowed to decide their fate. Constructive trusts, also referred to as
implied trusts, do not arise because of the expressed intent of the
settlor or settlors executing a formal trust. Rather, they are created
by a court of equity or a court exercising equitable powers to prevent
acts inconsistent with the perceived intention of the parties in question
from occurring.23
For two years, guidelines developed and approved by the National
Health and Medical Research Council have existed in Australia to
cover the ethical problems associated with in vitro fertilization pro-
grams. Guideline Seven specifically suggests that an upper time limit
20 Hancock & Ford, supra note 1.
21 See W. RAUSHENBUSH, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 1.5, 1.7 (3d
ed. 1975).
22 Id.
23 G.C. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 287, 305
(5th ed. 1973).
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be placed upon the storage of embryos based upon "the need or
competence of the female donor." 24 Applied, then, to a woman's
capability to conceive, it is obvious that at Mrs. Rios' death, her
capability to conceive had ended and the two embryos could be
destroyed. Interestingly, the Council, supported by the Australian
Medical Association, endorsed in 1982 not only the use of in vitro
fertilization as an acceptable scientific procedure to correct infertility
in married couples, but also the use of donor eggs from women and
the use of artificial insemination by anonymous male donors.2"
IV. THE SCOPE OF REMEDIAL ACTIONS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW
Central to any practical analysis of remedies available in the
United States is a determination of the "rights" or "standing" of
a conceptus, embryo or foetus. Presently, no standing, and thus no
right of action, exists for such an entity within an in vitro fertilization
procedure.26 Yet, if one were to acknowledge that the foetus becomes
a human being at the very instance of conception, then that entity
would be entitled to the full protection of the law and able to seek
legal redress should it be injured in some way upon actual birth. 27
If full personhood and the legal rights associated therewith are
not conferred upon a conceptus, but recognition is given to the fact
that such an entity is human in origin, and indeed, a potential human,
the next step would be to decide the extent to which the rights of
informed consent (here, of necessity, proxy consent) and the avoidance
of pain, harm or suffering-such rights being due all subjects who
participate in experimentations-are guaranteed to these "potential"
persons. 2s Equally as formidable would be a determination of whether
11 O'Neill & Hutton, Advice Exists on Rios Embryos, Says Health Council,
The (Austl.) Age, July 4, 1984, at 10, col. 3.
25 Sydney Sunday Telegraph, Nov. 7, 1982, at 6, col. 1. The South Australian
government gave its approval in April, 1984, to the freezing of fertilized ova as
part of its test-tube baby procedures. It specifically prohibited the use of frozen
fertilized ova for scientific or genetic research and the practice of surrogate. Sydney
Morning Herald, April 23, 1984, at 9, col. 5.
26 See materials cited supra, notes 14-20.
" See generally Brown, Legal Implications of the New Reproductive Tech-
nology, in MAKIN BABIES: THE TEST TUBE AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 61-75 (A. Nichols,
T. Hogan eds. 1984); Hearings, supra note 2, at 167-212 and 219-28 (testimony of
Lori B. Andrews and George J. Annas).
28 Carey, Informed Consent by Participants: Who Participates? Who Consents?,
in TEST TUBE BABIES, supra note 2 at 64-70.
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the rights and protections of personhood should be granted to the
in vitro conceptus upon its implantation. Again, iron-clad or boiler-
plate conclusions are not available simply because there is no un-
yielding legal, social, ethical or religious consensus on when life
begins.
After recognizing this quandary, consideration must be given to
the hapless fate of the excess fertilized eggs, since the normal pro-
cedure is to select only one egg for implantation.2 9 For those respecting
the human status of the fertilized egg, "death" through non-use or
elimination is not acceptable. Obviously, the better approach would
be to stop using hormones to induce super ovulation to recover a
quantity of eggs for fertilization. Instead, one egg at a time could
be retrieved during the woman's natural cycle to be used in the in
vitro fertilization procedure.3"
Whether viewed as an experimental or therapeutic process, in
vitro fertilization is, at each stage, fraught with hazardous conse-
quences.3" Once fertilization is achieved in vitro, transplantation pre-
sents the central obstacle for the survival and growth of the conceptus.32
Some authorities maintain that the direct manipulation of the oocytes
as well as the conceptus during the in vitro fertilization procedure
29 Hearings, supra note 2, at 264-93 (testimony of Richard Marrs, M.D.).
30 Id.; see also Henley, IVF and the Human Family and the Likely Conse-
quences, in TEST TUBE BABIES, supra note 2, at 79-87.
1, See Edwards & Sharpe, Social Values and Research in Human Embryology,
231 NATURE 87 (1971).
12 Id. For example, the success-failure statistics of the Monash University proj-
ect, (Melbourne, Australia) led by Professor Carl Wood (recognized as the "father"
of IVF) through the Queen Victoria Medical Center and two private hospitals show
for the years 1980 and 1981 the following:
1980 1981
Number 158 251
Eggs fertilized 174 311
Embryos transferred 137 254
Pregnancies 17 28
To be remembered is the fact that not every pregnancy resulted in a live birth; a
spontaneous abortion rate of between 25 and 5007 was recorded. Taking the two
years together, it was found that 11%o of the patients treated became pregnant, of
whom not less than 25076 miscarried. Of the embryos transferred, about 11.5%
began to develop in utero, again with a failure rate of not less than 25%. Thus,
the effective rate, in terms of babies born, is thought to lie between six and eight
percent. See Daniel, The Morality of In Vitro Fertilization, in MORAL STUDIES 47,
57 (T. Kennedy ed. 1984).
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could result in a significant risk that defective births would result.33
Nature can rectify many genetic errors in prospective newborns through
spontaneous abortion. In utero examination techniques such as am-
niocentesis, together with the "freedom of choice" abortion on de-
mand can also help to prevent the birth of severely defective children
conceived through in vitro procedures. Spontaneous abortions, how-
ever, do not always occur to abort defective foetuses and amni-
ocentesis is not capable of detecting a large variety of birth defects,
while "freedom of choice" abortion is not a practical freedom for
some. 34
When a physician-experimenter destroys an in vitro fertilized
conceptus before implantation, either on his own or with the consent
or by the direction of the parents, no criminal liability is imposed
simply because the conceptus is destroyed before it is "viable" and
hence no "person" is recognized as being in existence.35 If a conceptus
fails to survive because of inherent deficiencies with in vitro fertil-
ization technologies, no civil liability is imposed, since presumably
a full disclosure of the risks of such an undertaking was made to
the participating parents, and their informed consent obtained.3 6 Yet,
it is conceivable that for a willful destruction of a conceptus by a
participating experimenter, three causes of action might be pursued
by the parents: breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional
distress or wrongful death.
31
In reality, owing to the experimental nature of the present in
vitro fertilization technology, it is highly improbable that any ex-
perimenter would contractually guarantee the certain success of the
procedure or warrant its total effectiveness. Neither would an action
for emotional distress hold much opportunity for success, since it
would be nearly impossible for the parents to demonstrate that the
very process of in vitro fertilization is "outrageous," and that they
11 Kass, Making Babies-The New Biology and The "Old" Morality, 26 PUB.
INTEREST 27 (1972). See also Kass, Babies by Means of In Vitro Fertilization:
Unethical Experiments on the Unborn?, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1174, 1178 (1971).
14 Kass, supra note 33, PUB. INTEREST at 28-29.
11 Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Areas for Lit-
igation, 35 Sw. L.J. 973, 996, 999 (1982); Cohen, The "Brave New Baby" and
the Law: Fashioning Remedies for the Victims of In Vitro Fertilization, 4 AM. J.
L. & MED. 319, 328-29 (1978).
36 Cohen, supra note 35, at 329.
31 Id. at 330.
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in fact suffered from great emotional distress as a consequence of
the destruction of their conceptus.31 Since wrongful death actions are
tied to proof of the death of a "person," and since the destruction
of the conceptus would most likely occur before implantation, it is
improbable that proof could be established regarding the viability
of the conceptus in order to establish a cause of action for wrongful
death .9
An infant born of an in vitro fertilization process, but with a
genetic deficiency or other abnormality, would be within his rights
to sue the experimenter-physician and the participating hospital for
negligence, specifically for damages caused by prenatal injury and
for wrongful life. Pain and suffering damages could be awarded by
asserting that, as a handicapped infant, he would have preferred no
life at all to one of deformity. 40 The developing case law for the
tort of wrongful life, however, is emerging slowly and erratically
throughout the jurisdictions in the United States, 4' as it is also with
a wrongful birth action maintained by parents who assert conception
would have been avoided or terminated if proper counsel had been
provided concerning the attendant risks of a handicapped child being
born.42
38 Id.
19 Lorio, supra note 35, at 998. The very first action for wrongful termination
of an in vitro fertilization procedure was filed in New York against Columbia
Presbyterian Medical Center and Dr. Raymond Vandle Wiele by Dr. and Mrs. John
Del Zio who claimed $1.5 million in damages. Mrs. Del Zio was awarded $50,000
for emotional distress. The relief was not awarded for the wrongful death of the
fetus, but was a recognition of a loss of an interest akin to personal property. Del
Zio v. Manhattan's Columbia Presbyterian Med. Center, No. 74-3588 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 12, 1978).
'° Lorio, supra note 35, at 999-1004.
" See Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Curlender v. Bio-
Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 2d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1980). See also Rogers,
Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and
Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713 (1982); Annas, Righting the Wrong of Wrongful
Life, 11 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 8 (1981); Peters & Peters, Wrongful Life: Recognizing
the Defective Child's Right to a Cause of Action, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 857 (1980).
The strongest argument against recognizing the tort of wrongful life is that
a cause of action requires a child to plead that he would be better off had he
never been born. Such an argument or position seems to run counter to, if not
destroy, the traditional beliefs in the sanctity of all life. See G. SMITH, GENETICS,
ETHICs, AND THE LAW, Ch. 4 (1981).
,2 See Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz,
46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Gleitman v. Cosgrove,
49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
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Finally, if a theory of strict liability were to be imposed for all
in vitro fertilization procedures, with the experimenter-physician being
held liable for any and all birth defects arising from his "abnormally
dangerous" work, the maintenance of a suit by or on behalf of a
child conceived through such procedures could be brought with rel-
ative ease. 43 Such a public policy declaration or pronouncement by
the courts or legislatures would have a devastating effect on the in
vitro fertilization process as a means of combating infertility and
is not to be preferred as a means of meeting the challenges and
problems of in vitro fertilization.
Traditional forms of relief in the United States-judicial prec-
edent, legislative design and technological developments-may be used
to develop over the course of time a sound strategy for meeting the
challenges of this new reproductive biology. Given an absence of
clear and unequivocal postures in Australian jurisprudence regarding
the scope of liability for negligent medical malpractice and the rec-
ognition of the torts of wrongful life and wrongful birth," Australia
will be faced with a need for law reform in this area, hopefully to
be achieved through the legislative process instead of by judicial
design.
V. THE REFORM MOVEMENT
Since there appears to be no legal authority to prevent the
fertilization of human eggs in a laboratory, private or otherwise
4
and, given the growing realization that courtrooms are an improper
forum for resolving complex philosophical dilemmas based on com-
peting scientific and technological developments 4 6 what remains for
the future? Can an accommodation be reached along some humane,
equitable or objective lines?
In early 1982, law reform activity in the field of the new re-
productive biology began in earnest under the vigorous leadership
," Cohen, supra note 35, at 334.
" See Bates supra note 11. See also S. HAYES & R. HAYES, MENTAL RETAR-
DATION: LAW POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION (1981).
41 R. SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 202 (1982). See also MONASH UNIV.,
CENTER FOR HUMAN BIOETHICS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE, In Vitro Fer-
tilization: Problems and Possibilities (Mar. 11, 1982, Melbourne, Australia).
46 M. Kirby, Foreword to MAKING BABIES: THE TEST TUBE AND CHRISTIAN
ETHICS at ix (A. Nichols, T. Hogan eds. 1984).
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of Russell Scott of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission,
who headed an advisory committee studying artificial insemination.
A few weeks later, the Victorian government established a committee,
subsequently designated the Waller Committee, chaired by Louis
Waller, the distinguished Sir Leo Cussen Professor of Law at Monash
University. The Committee's mandate was to investigate the problems
arising from in vitro fertilization and donor gametes (the male sperm
and female eggs). The Queensland government and that of Western
Australia soon followed with similar research activities.47
The Waller Report, On the Disposition of Embryos, Produced
by In Vitro Fertilization, was released in mid August, 1984, in Mel-
bourne, Australia, by the Attorney General of Victoria. The Waller
Committee concluded that the disposition of stored embryos is not
to be determined by the hospital where they are in fact stored;"8 that
such embryos are not to be regarded as possessing legal rights or
having rights to lay claim to inheritance; 9 and in cases where "by
mischance or for any other reason, an embryo is stored which cannot
be transferred as planned, and no agreed provision has been made
at the time of storage . . . the embryos shall be removed from
storage." 50 The Committee additionally held that embryos could be
frozen 5' and that experimental research "shall be immediate and in
an approved and current project in which the embryo shall not be
allowed to develop beyond the state of implantation, which is com-
pleted fourteen days after fertilizations. 5 2 Some of the recommen-
dations of the Committee will be incorporated in the Victorian
government's in vitro legislative proposals for subsequent parlia-
mentary adoption, while others will be open to further debate and
study. 3
' Lawson, Molloy, Jobson & Walley, supra note 5, at 25.
48 COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ARISING
FROM IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, REPORT ON THE DISPOSITION OF EMBRYOS PRODUCED
BY IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (1984), at § 2.16.
49 Id. at § 2.19.
50 Id. at § 2.18. See Orphaned Embryos May be Left to Thaw, Sydney Morning
Herald, Sept. 4, 1984, at 3, col. 1.
"' COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ARISING
FROM IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, REPORT ON THE DISPOSITION OF EMBRYOS PRODUCED
BY IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (1984), at §§ 3.25-3.28.
52 Id. at § 3.29.
13 See, Victoria Will Bar Payments to Surrogate Mothers, Sydney Morning
Herald, Sept. 4, 1984, at 3, col. 2. What could be regarded as the British counterpart
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The standing committee of Attorney-Generals of Australia has
agreed on the desirability of working toward the development of a
uniform code of legislation to cover in vitro fertilization and the
legal status of children born through the use of donor semen or
ova.54 One can but guess whether a working consensus will ever be
reached among the six state governments, thereby allowing for a
uniform code of regulation. Terms such as "when life begins" must
be agreed upon before any regulations can be written.
A. A Reprieve or A New Beginning?
Disregarding the recommendation of the Waller Committee re-
garding the Rios' "orphan" embryos, the legislature in the State of
Victoria enacted a plan which directs that an attempt be made to
have the embryos implanted in a surrogate and, if subsequent birth
results, the child be placed for adoption. 55 Although restricted in
application to the two Rios' embryos, the plan would have obvious
repercussions for the future development of policy in this field.
56
Thus, any children resulting from the embryo implants would, under
this new Victorian legislation, be taken to be the children only of
the adoptive parents.5 7 The extent, if any, to which the law of Victoria
would impact upon a legal action in California would be quite spec-
ulative.
B. Legislative Realities
The New South Wales Parliament passed the Artificial Con-
ception Bill, given Royal Assent on March 5, 1984, which states that
of the Waller Committee, the Warnock Commission, proposed a ban on surrogate
mothers, yet concluded that embryo research should be permitted until the fourteenth
day after fertilization when the first identifiable features of the embryo develop.
TIME, Aug. 6, 1984, at 50. See THE WARNOCK COMMISSION, Report of the Committee
of Inquiry Into Human Fertilization and Embryology (July 1984). See also Priest,
The Report of the Warnock Committee on Human Fertilization and Embryology,
48 MOD. L. REV. 73 (1985).
14 Lawson, Molloy, Jobson & Walley, supra note 5, at 25.
,1 Australians Reject Bid to Destroy 2 Embryos, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1984,
at A18, col. 3.
56 Interview with Mr. Hayden Storey, the author of the Victorian legislation,
on ABC's Good Morning America (Oct. 24, 1984)(stressing that his proposal had
only specific application to the "special category" which the Rios' embryos enjoyed
and that he anticipated no extension to other possible cases).
" Corns, Legal Regulation of In Vitro Fertilization in Victoria, 1984 LAW
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a child born from in vitro fertilization where genetic material is
provided by the husband and wife, or where semen is provided by
a donor, will be deemed the child of the husband and wife. The
same principles are also applied to de facto relationships. Yet, inter-
estingly, the law does not cover children born as a result of an in
vitro fertilization procedure using donated ova.
58
A partial legislative response to the confusion of the in vitro fer-
tilization procedure has been posited by the Victorian Parliament.
Read on March 20, 1984, before the Legislative Council, the Infertility
(Medical Procedures) Bill of 1984 would, when enacted, legalize the
in vitro fertilization procedure for married couples after a waiting
period of anywhere from twelve to twenty-four months, during which
time the couple is examined in order to determine whether these
procedures are the only available means of achieving pregnancy. The
couple is also counseled regarding the potential chances for success
and failure. Provision is made to allow donor sperm, if the husband
is infertile, or donated ova where the wife is incapable of producing
eggs. As drafted originally, the proposal carries no declarations or
protections for frozen embryos. 9
C. A Network of Safety
Sir Gustav Nossal has suggested that instead of cumbersome
legislative restrictions on the use and development of new reproductive
technologies, a "network of safeguards" already in place in some
respects, simply needs to be tightened. Continuing public debate on
the issue of scientific freedom versus governmental regulation is the
focal point of the "network." Additional components include the
further development of safety standards, self-regulating industrial
guidelines and ethical codes and reliance upon the Common Law
mechanism of "reasonable case" to shape and determine the extent
to which experimentations and scientific investigations will be allowed.
Finally, greater reliance upon national committees within the Ministry
INST. J. 838.
Lawson, Molloy, Jobson & Walley, supra note 5, at 25.
'9 Address by J. Asche, Conference on Ethical Implication in The Use of
Donor Sperm, Eggs and Embryos in The Treatment of Human Infertility, 57 LAW
INST. J. OF VICTORIA 716-19 (1983). See Smith & Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and
The New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 263 (1984).
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of Science and Technology for overseeing Australian research in this
field is urged. 6°
A noted American authority suggests action to be undertaken
at three levels: the enactment of model state legislation which defines
with clarity the identity of both the legal mother and father of all
children, including those born to other than their genetic parents;
the development and promulgation by concerned professional or-
ganizations of guidelines for sound clinical practice; and the estab-
lishment of a national body of various experts in law, medicine,
science, ethics and public policy whose mandate would be to monitor
on-going developments in the area, and to report to Congress on




So long as the family is the focal point of society, legal and
medical initiatives and safeguards must be explored in order to assure
the very success of the family unit and to discover ways to neutralize
if not stabilize the "unexpected." The Rios case is but a precursor
or a paradigm of major problems to arise in the future as the
challenges, hopes and frustrations of the brave new world visit them-
selves in full force. The legislative resolution of this particular case
was both proper and reasonable. If change must occur, and indeed
it must, it should be charted in the legislative assemblies where the
conscience and the understanding of each region of the country may
be codified as a response mechanism to the various developments
in the new reproductive biology as they are tested and subsequently
become the facts of life. Infertility as an impediment to family growth
must be studied and, when feasible, arrested. 62 It is only through
60 Nossal, The Impact of Genetic Engineering on Modern Medicine, 27 QuAD-
RANT 22-27 (Nov. 1983). See also Scott, Test-Tube Babies, Experimental Medicine
and Allied Problems, 58 AUSTL. L.J. 405 (July 1984). Mr. Scott suggests the formation
of a standing advisory committee charged with responding to the whole range of
problems and which would be given the added responsibility of developing ethical
guidelines in the form of codes of practice. He suggests that the Medical Research
Ethics Committee of Australia is a strong beginning to resolving the problems in
this field. Id. at 416.
6' Annas, Redefining Parenthood and Protecting Embryos: Why We Need New
Laws, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 50 (Oct. 1984).
62 See The New Origins of Life: How the Science of Conception Brings Hope
to Childless Couples, TIME Sept. 10, 1984, at 46.
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continued, cautious research into the process of in vitro fertilization
that the family will be assured of its rightful privacy in society and
the tragic circumstances of infertility met and resolved.
The Nossal approach is sound, but it can be strengthened by
legislative and regulatory programs 63 of the design and nature of the
present undertaking in Victoria which seeks to validate and control
in vitro fertilization procedures. If a creative approach to problem
resolution can be profferred here by drawing on the best elements
of the Nossal approach and the law reform efforts being pursued
presently, Australia will be able to boast of a full and active part-
nership between law and scientific medicine-with the legacy of such
an undertaking redounding to the benefit of all mankind.6
EDITOR'S NOTE:-In a letter dated August 29, 1985, from Pro-
fessor Louis Waller, Chairperson of the Law Reform Commission
of Victoria, to Professor Smith, the current status of the Rios'
"orphan embryos" was stated as remaining the same: they have
not been transferred to a surrogate mother and are still stored at
the Queen Victoria Medical Center in Melbourne, Australia. A copy
of the letter is on file in the offices of the JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW.
61 For an eloquent analysis of legislative, as opposed to judicial strengths in
managing the problems of in vitro fertilization, see Address by M. Kirby, IVF-
The Scope and Limitation of Law, presented in London, England, Sept. 1983, at The
Conference of Bioethics and The Law of Human Conception-In Vitro
Fertilization.
" See generally Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Co-
nundrums, 64 GEO. L.J. 697 (1976). See also TEST-TUBE BABIES: A GUIDE TO MORAL
QUESTIONS, PRESENT TECHNIQUES AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES (W. Walter & P. Singer
eds. 1982).
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